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WHAT WOULD CONGRESS WANT? IF WE WANT TO KNOW,
WHY NOT ASK?
Danieli Evans∗

Judges often disagree about which interpretation of a statute is most
faithful to ‘legislative intent.’ If judges are concerned about adhering to
democratic preferences when interpreting statutes, why not ask
Congress what it would prefer? I propose a procedure that would
enable the Court, in a case where Justices are divided over the meaning
of a statute, to submit both sides’ reasoning to Congress, and Congress
may choose to vote on its preferred of the alternative rulings the Court
puts before it. Congress’s preferences would be evidentiary only; they
would not bind the Court to make one decision or another. Insofar as
the Court is concerned with avoiding a decision that Congress will
overrule, this procedure could provide more reliable and direct
evidence of what the contemporary Congress wants, than does postenactment legislative history, canons of construction, or other means
judges use to adduce legislative intent. This procedure would enable a
partnership between the Court and Congress in updating and adapting
the law to ever-changing circumstances; a partnership that draws upon
each branch’s particular competencies—Congress being democratic,
the Court accounting for overarching constitutional values and ideals of
predictability, consistency, and intelligibility in the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most would agree that courts interpreting legislation should aim, as best
possible, to adhere to the intent of the legislature.1 Inconsistency in the
methods judges use to decipher Congress’s intent has generated the
impression that statutory interpretation decisions are ad hoc or made to suit
the Court’s own outcome preferences.2 Debates about statutory meaning
cause acrimony between the Justices, the Court, and Congress.3 Justice
Scalia has criticized Congress for an “ever-increasing volume” of “[f]uzzy,
leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation,”4 and other
members of the Court for reaching outcomes that “require[] not
interpretation but invention.”5 Members of the public criticize judges for

1. E.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law, in WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 718
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT] (“The
court should respect the position of the legislature as chief policy-determining agency of the society,
subject only to the limitations of the constitution.”); James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 156 (2003); Russell Carparelli, Separate Powers-Shared
Responsibility: Constructing Avenues of Interbranch Communication, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 267, 267
(2007) (“[S]cholars and jurists have written countless books, articles, and opinions about the separation
of powers and how courts should go about exercising their judgment to effect legislative intent.”). But
Justice Scalia “reject[s] the intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law,” and instead
argues that legislation should be given its “plain meaning,” regardless of intent. Antonin Scalia,
Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University 79, 94 (Mar.
1995).
2. E.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1767 (2010) (observing that
inconsistency in methodological approach “makes the Court appear results-oriented, because the
governing principles change from case to case”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2005); Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002).
This has been a pervasive concern dating back to Dean Pound’s worry about “spurious” statutory
interpretation. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 706; Scalia, supra note 1, at 94.
3. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J.
1155, 1172–73 (2007); ROBERT A. KAGAN, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 44–51
(2001).
4. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
5. Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2939 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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“legislating from the bench.”6 And legislators have criticized the Court for
“the denigration . . . of congressional authority.”7
Commentators have aimed to address this problem by promoting
better cooperation between legislatures and courts. They have proposed
inter-branch committees to enhance communication between courts and
legislatures, and one author has argued that courts should certify
questions of statutory interpretation to Congress, so as to provide
Congress an opportunity to amend the law as it would apply to the
pending judicial decision.8 These efforts at enhancing judiciallegislative collaboration aim to prompt Congress to amend an
ambiguous statute. But requiring Congress to pass an amendment to the
law does not alleviate the problems of congressional delay, committee
stalling, and limits on the legislative agenda that cause Congress’s
general slowness in correcting legislation that is plainly causing
confusion among courts.9 Additionally, as discussion of this proposal
illustrates, judges actually do play an important partnership role in
developing statutory law; refining it with rule of law, public policy, and
constitutional values that legislators do not always consider when
drafting legislation. Proposals that merely aim to provoke a more
prompt legislative response do not fully embrace the value that judges
add to statutory interpretation decisions. This procedure is designed to
draw on the relative competencies of judges and legislators to enable a
true partnership between the branches in updating and adapting statutory
law to fit unforeseen scenarios.
Congress would enact legislation providing that the Court, in cases
where the Justices disagree about best interpretation, could voluntarily
certify a statement of the competing reasoning (just as would be
included in a majority and dissenting opinion) along with a multiple
choice question asking Congress to vote on its preferred outcome.
Congress would have the option of declining to respond. The Court can
weigh the response as it chooses: it could decline to follow it, consider it
as one factor in the decision along with other tools of statutory
construction, or rely on a strong congressional preference for one
6. E.g., Martin Mayer, Why They Legislate ‘From the Bench’, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0913/p08s02-coop.html; Jeffrey Rosen, What’s
Wrong with Judges Legislating from the Bench?, TIME MAG. (July 16, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910989,00.html#ixzz1iJr2WHLE.
7. .Wheeler & Katzmann, supra note 3; Confirmation Hearing of the Nomination of John G.
Roberts Jr. To Be the Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 2–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?granuleId=&packageId=GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.
8. Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2007).
9. For instance, the Court has heard four cases in recent years, all pertaining to the meaning of
“violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2283
(Scalia, J. dissenting).
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outcome as evidence in favor of that ruling, knowing that a contrary
outcome would likely be overruled. This procedure would allow the
Court to ascertain current democratic preferences more accurately,
reliably, and efficiently than other sources the Court has relied upon,
such as post-enactment legislative history, legislative acquiescence,
linguistic canons, and various other interpretive methodologies.
Following this introduction, Part II provides brief background on the
debate about statutory interpretation methodology that is useful for
framing this procedure. Part III describes other proposals for judiciallegislative cooperation which illustrate that judges, academics, and
legislators recognize this problem, and may be likely to endorse a
solution along the lines I am proposing. Part IV provides background
on certification procedures that serve as precedent for this proposal.
Part V describes the multiple-choice certification procedure. Part VI
explains how the certification procedure would have been invoked in
three of the Court’s recent decisions addressing slightly different types
of statutory interpretation problems. Part VII addresses questions about
the constitutionality of this proposal. In conclusion, I will describe how
this partners the particular competencies of the two branches in dynamic
statutory interpretation.
II. THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DEBATE
Our legal regime is dominated by statutes. Courts deciding questions
of statutory law are in a more deferential position than when they decide
questions of common or constitutional law, where they are the final
authority on meaning.10 There is a strong democratic sentiment favoring
judicial deference to legislative will, no doubt grounded in anxiety about
counter-majoritarian courts subverting the choices of elected officials.
Hamilton expressed this concern in Federalist No. 78, warning that
courts must not substitute their preferences for those of the legislative
10. See, e.g., supra note 1; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (noting prominence of statutory law in
contemporary regime); Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature?
When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 837 (2009) (“Statutory
interpretation is at the cutting edge of legal scholarship and, now, legislative activity.”); GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985) (commenting on the dominance of
legislatures and statutory law); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the
Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 279 (1991) (“[The] complexities of the law making and lawinterpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic dialogue between those who
make and those who interpret legislation.”); JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL
COMITY (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between
Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653 (1992); Shirley S.
Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory
Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991).
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body. Justice Scalia echoes this concern: “[i]t is simply not compatible
with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean,
and that unelected judges decide what that is.”11 But judges can be said
to add value precisely because they are independent of, and can be
resistant to, democratic actors. Judicial review has been justified by the
notion that judges balance out short-sighted and reactionary political
bodies by making decisions with a “longer view” of history, keeping in
mind overarching constitutional values, as well as the ideals of stability,
consistency, reliability, and intelligibility in the law.12 There is a tension
between this conception of the counter-majoritarian value of judges and
courts striving to defer as faithfully as possible to the choices of the
legislature. Judicial efforts to defer to Congress’s intent have generated
“interminable repetition of . . . essentially the same methodological
debates” about how to ascertain what Congress wanted; and there is
little consistency in their methods for doing so.13 I do not aim to fully
11. Scalia, supra note 1, at 97.
12. Richard Albert, Why Judicial Review: A Preliminary Typology of Scholarly Arguments,
INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2013), available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/03/whyjudicial-review. While a constitutional decision rather than a statutory one, the Court’s discussion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), describes some of the judicial values that could also
be said to apply in decisions interpreting legislation:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether
the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Id. at 854–55.
13. Gluck, supra note 2, at 1766. In arguing for more uniform rules of statutory construction,
Gluck provides a thorough overview of methodological disagreement about how judges should interpret
statutory law. Id. at 1761–68. Justice Scalia recognizes, “[I]t [is] frequently said in judicial opinions of
my court and others that the judge’s objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to ‘the intent of
the legislature.’” However, the evidence suggests that despite frequent statements to the contrary, “[w]e
do not really look for subjective legislative intent.” Scalia, supra note 1, at 91–92. For more on how
textualists consider legislative intent, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1983); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287, 286–93 (1985); Caleb Nelson,
What is Textualism? 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). Judges who look to sources beyond the text sometimes
seem to defer to only the enacting legislators’ understanding by imaginatively reconstructing enactment,
while at other times they aim more generally to serve the overarching purpose of the legislation. See
Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1111; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817–22 (1983); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946); POSNER, supra, at 286–93; Nelson, supra; STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2011); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).
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recount the debate between interpretive methodologies here. Suffice it
to say that this indeterminacy invites judges to select between
interpretive methods,14 and gives rise to suspicion that Judges
manipulate formal reasoning in order to reach their own preferred
outcomes.15
Many times, Congress has overridden the Court’s unfavorable
statutory interpretation decisions by amending the law.16 This requires
significant legislative resources, and it may be difficult to fit a corrective
amendment on the overloaded congressional agenda, since enacting new
legislation takes priority (as it is higher political visibility).
Additionally, concentration of power in committees and committee
chairs might stall initiative to override a judicial interpretation, even

14. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 1169; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 2; Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195,
214 (1983); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 221 (2010).
15. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 287 (“The irresponsible judge will twist any approach to yield
the outcomes that he desires, and the stupid judge will do the same thing unconsciously.”); Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 2, at 5–6; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002); Robert A. Katzmann, Making Sense of Congressional Intent:
Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE L.J. 2345, 2346 (1995) (“When courts interpret
legislation, . . . they become an integral component of the legislative process.”); Jellum, supra note 10,
at 839 (“[L]egislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as activist meddlers.”). Even judges
who earnestly aim to act as neutral ‘faithful agents’ inevitably make interpretive decisions within the
context of their own ‘normative horizons.’ ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 1241–42;
Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk with Judge Richard Posner, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2011)
(“[S]ome judges fool themselves into thinking there is a correct answer, generated by a precedent or
other authoritative text, to every legal question . . . [p]eople want to avoid . . . ’cognitive
dissonance,’ . . . [w]e were taught in law school what we are supposed to be doing as judges—apply the
law, not make it up.”) (quoting Judge Posner).
16. E.g., Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008),
overruled by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009);
S. REP. No. 111-010 (2009) (“This section amends the FCA to clarify and correct erroneous
interpretations of the law that were decided in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128
S. Ct. 2123 (2008).”); W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), overruled by Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), overruled by Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433,
104 Stat. 978 (1990); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), overruled by
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986);
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), overruled by Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986); see also generally Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. J.REV. 887, 903–10 (2000); ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY
& GARRETT, supra note 1, at 347–48; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. J. REV. 425, 448 (1992);
Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37
(1991); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the
Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 53 (2000); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc.
v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 622–23 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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when a majority of the legislature opposes it.17 Justice Stevens
described the Court as doing a “disservice to the Country” if it issues a
ruling that requires Congress “to take the time to revisit the
matter . . . whenever its work product suffers from an omission or
inadvertent error.”18 This consumes significant legislative resources,
taking time away from other issues that lawmakers might be focusing
on.
III. OTHER PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR INTER-BRANCH COOPERATION
A number of judges, policymakers, and academics have proposed
measures for promoting cooperation and communication between courts
and legislatures. Many state legislatures have also taken measures to aid
courts in accurately adhering to legislative will. This suggests that
judges and lawmakers recognize the problem, and that they might be
inclined to take advantage of a procedure along the lines of what I am
proposing. While these efforts to address the disconnect between courts
and legislatures illustrate desire to address the problem, they all fail to
overcome the inherent problems that arise from relying on Congress to
amend the law in question.
Frost’s Argument for Legislative Certification: Frost sets forth a
certification procedure whereby the Court would send a question to
Congress in ambiguous statutory interpretation cases.19
After
identifying many of the advantages of referring a statutory interpretation
question directly to Congress, including improving communication,
reducing conflict, best taking advantage of the competencies of each
branch, and promoting transparency, Frost proposes that courts refer a
clearly stated question about a statutory ambiguity to the ranking
members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.20 The
certifying court would abstain from deciding the case in order to provide
Congress with at least a six-month opportunity to amend the statute.
Assuming Congress does so, the amended law would then be applied to
the pending case. On Frost’s description, “judicial referral is not
seeking the current Congress’s interpretation of a previously enacted
17. For instance, Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett explain that the majority of Congress likely
disapproved of the Court’s pro-disparate impact interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), but were unable to enact overriding legislation because the committees were
“dominated by preferences to the left of chambers on civil rights. And because those committees
exercised gatekeeping power over issues on the legislative agenda, they had substantial ability to head
off overrides of agency policies or judicial decisions.” ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRET, supra note 1, at
86.
18. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Frost, supra note 8.
20. Id. at 5–6.
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statute, but instead is enlisting the current Congress’s help by asking it
to revise a poorly drafted statute.”21
Because it envisions staying a judicial decision while provoking
Congress to amend the ambiguous law, Frost’s proposal leaves
unresolved the important practical and structural problems identified
above.22
Frost’s procedure is essentially a judicially prompted
amendment process. There is no constraint on the extent to which
Congress can amend the legislation in question: “the Congress that
receives a judicial referral may choose to radically alter, rather than to
clarify, the statute at issue.”23 Because Frost’s proposal essentially
provides for provoking Congress to amend the law in response to a
judicial decision, it is functionally similar to the following inter-branch
committee proposals. Frost acknowledges that several problems arise
from allowing Congress unrestrained discretion to amend the law as
applied to a pending decision: impermissible case-by-case delegation of
authority to Congress, Ex Post Facto concerns that arise from this
delegation, politicization of decision making.24 For reasons discussed in
Part VII, these constitutional concerns are ameliorated when the Court
constrains Congress to outcomes that the Justices are prepared to adopt
themselves.
Interbranch Committees: Judge Cardozo, Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsberg, Judge Mikva, Judge Katzmann have all proposed committees
that would facilitate inter-branch communication. In 1921, Judge
Cardozo lamented that in a regime increasingly dominated by statutory
law, “[t]he courts are not helped as they could and ought to be in the
adaptation of law to justice.” Judge Cardozo’s problem was that there
was no way to signal to the legislature that it should update or weigh in
on the development of the law.25 Cardozo argued for a “Ministry of
Justice” that would be composed of members of the judiciary, the
legislature, law schools, and the bar. Cardozo’s Ministry would mediate
between the Court and the Legislature by studying the law and
recommending changes so that “[t]he spaces between the planets will at
last be bridged.”26
In a similar vein, Justice Stevens also proposed that there should be a
21. Id. at 38.
22. One commentator responds to Frost’s proposal: “The devil is all in the details, I think, since
there would have to be some meaningful guidelines on the exercise of such a certification power. As the
article shows, drawing these lines is hard work and it is hard to see why the certification system
wouldn’t be gamed.” Ethan Lieb, Certifying a Question to Congress?, PRAWFSBLOG (May 18, 2007),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/05/certifying_ques.html.
23. Id. at 38.
24. Frost, supra note 8, at 36–41.
25. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113 (1921).
26. Id. at 125.
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standing committee in Congress charged with identifying conflicts that
arise from ambiguity or omissions in statutes, and drafting bills to
resolve them. He argued that when “the conflict is over the meaning of
an ambiguous statutory provision, it may be both more efficient and
more appropriate to allow Congress to make the necessary choice
between alternative interpretations of the legislative intent.”27 If the
Court were faced with a case that involved pure ambiguity or
uncertainty about the meaning of a statute, “it would seem to make good
sense to assign Congress the task of performing the necessary corrective
lawmaking.” In a footnote, Justice Stevens explained, “I do not mean to
suggest that the Supreme Court should seek to certify issues of statutory
construction to a legislative committee. Rather I am suggesting that the
policymaking branch of the federal government might assign itself that
task.”28 Importantly, Justice Stevens’ statement seems to suggest that a
certification procedure would be acceptable and even desirable if the
legislature itself adopted the practice. (The ‘certifying’ that Justice
Stevens envisions appears to contemplate sending the question to a
legislative committee, instead of to the entire legislature for a floor vote.
A vote on preferences by the whole legislature is more democratically
legitimate than a committee’s response.)
Justice Ginsburg, Judge Robert Katzmann, and Judge Abner Mikva
have also proposed and attempted implementing a “transmission belt”
between the judiciary and Congress. The belt would convey judicial
opinions indicating uncertainty about a statute’s meaning to a statutory
revision committee composed of members of the House and Senate as
well as retired members of the judiciary.29 The committee would “hear
and initiate action on pleas for a clear statement of ‘what Congress
meant (or in any event what it means now.)’”30 Mikva envisions that:
[T]he lawyers who argue those cases, and certainly the administrators
who initiate the interpretation and enforcement process, should be
called . . . [and] that the opinions of courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court interpreting statutes be distributed to all members of the House and
Senate having responsibility for the statute in question.31

In a slightly different vein, Judge Calabresi has also proposed a

27. John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 183 (1982).
28. Id. at n.20.
29. Wheeler & Katzmann, supra note 3; Robert A. Katzmann, No Court is an Island, 8 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 115 (2006); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420–21 (1987); Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 10; Abner J. Mikva,
Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627 (1987); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s
Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 384 (1987).
30. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 29, at 1433.
31. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 29, at 630–31.
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“constitutional remand”: In evaluating the constitutionality of a state law
whose rational basis findings were out of date, Judge Calabresi argued
that the matter should be ‘remanded’ so the legislature could provide an
updated statement on its contemporary rational basis for the law.32
While the “constitutional remand” was not proposed in the context of
interpreting a statute, it provides another example of judicial efforts to
invite legislative input on a pending decision.
State Measures: Along these lines, a number of states have
established law revision commissions that periodically review judicial
decisions interpreting legislation in order to identify defects or
anachronisms in statutes that are causing the judiciary trouble, or being
applied in an unfavorable manner.33
All of these procedures are geared toward prompting Congress to
amend legislation. Because these proposals do not offer a means for
circumventing the costly amendment process, they do not overcome a
general lack of initiative to amend existing law, given policymakers’
occupation with new legislation on more pressing political issues. They
also do not avoid the challenge of mustering agreement on the scope and
language of a new amendment, or control and stalling by nonrepresentative committee members, which might preclude Congress
from successfully amending a law. Compared with inter-branch
committee proposals and Frost’s proposal of referring a statute to
Congress for revision, Congress has more incentive to take advantage of
the middle-of-the road procedure I propose here: Congress has a chance
to address the problem without going through the resource and time
intensive process of amending the legislation. While voting on a
certified question would not create the same binding solution as
amending the law—the Court could always decline to follow Congress’s
vote—it would give Congress an efficient way to address a problem that
may not rise to the priority level of amending a statute.34 Following a
brief background on inter-jurisdictional certification procedures, I will
32. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
33. Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 10, at 1061–68.
34. I should note there are two existing ways that Congress might weigh in on pending judicial
decisions. Congress is able to enact a sense-of-Congress resolution expressing its views on the subject.
Sense-of-Congress resolutions present the same practical problems that have inhibited congressional
response to judicial decisions: because the sense-of-Congress resolution is not judicially prompted,
gathering support for such an initiative is vulnerable stalling, delay, and preoccupation with new policy
matters. Moreover, it would be unlikely for a sense-of-Congress resolution to speak as specifically to
the choice between the competing rationales that the Justices have defined. Essentially, this procedure
is a judicially prompted and judicially constrained sense-of-Congress resolution. A second alternative is
Congress filing an amicus brief. A Congressional amicus brief faces the same problems of initiative,
directly addressing the precise alternatives the Justices are willing to endorse, and it also suffers
representative problems, since amicus briefs are generally filed by particular members of Congress,
rather than representing the strength of support within the whole body.
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describe the procedure in more detail, and show how it could have been
used in some of the Court’s recent statutory interpretation decisions.
IV. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Certification is a process whereby one decision-making body obtains
an answer to a question of law from another entity, where each could
legitimately make a decision in that area. Certification mediates among
different jurisdictions and branches of government that are both sources
of authority on a legal question.35 Federal appellate courts can certify
uncertain questions to the U.S. Supreme Court,36 and federal courts can
certify questions to state supreme courts. This process developed in
response to an interpretive problem faced by federal courts applying
state law. This creates challenges similar to statutory interpretation—in
both instances courts seek to deferentially interpret law created by an
external source of legal authority. Federal courts struggled to rule on
ambiguous or unresolved questions of state law, including state statutes,
by anticipating and speculating what ‘reasonable’ lawyers and judges
trained in the state’s law would do. In 1945, frustrated with federal
courts’ faltering efforts to predict state law, the Florida state legislature
enacted a law authorizing the Florida Supreme Court to adopt rules for
accepting certified questions from federal courts of appeal and the
United States Supreme Court. Since then, a vast majority of state
legislatures have passed procedures for certifying questions from federal
courts to their supreme courts.37
Certification procedures are voluntary on both ends; the state supreme
court can accept or decline the certified question, but it must provide a
response to the certifying federal court.38 The U.S. Supreme Court and
federal courts have certified a variety of questions to state supreme
courts, pertaining to common law and statutory interpretation.39 This
35. James William Moore & Allan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in
Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1949).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006).
37. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 164 (2003); Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine
Comity: Certification (At Last) in North Carolina, 58 DUKE L. J. 69, 71 n.13 (2008).
38. Both federal and state courts have adopted standards for determining whether to expend the
time to certify or answer a question, depending on the importance of the question to the outcome of the
case and to state policy. O’Mara v. Town of Wappinger, 485 F.3d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 2007); W.
Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 633 (Or. 1991).
39. These decisions include questions about state intestate law: Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249
(1963); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (whether a higher state court had power to
review the constitutional claims in question); Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003)
(whether an Internet domain name is “property” subject to the tort of conversion); Woodward v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002) (the definition of a ‘child’ for the purposes of
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inter-jurisdictional certification is touted as promoting comity and
federalism; allowing state courts greater self-determination in shaping
their law, and greater control over state policy and state regulation of
primary conduct.40
This rationale extends to federal agencies
interpreting state law, as a Delaware statute permits the state supreme
court to answer questions certified to it from the Securities and
Exchange Commission.41 Delaware’s law is significant, as it provides
an example of not only inter-jurisdictional certification (from federal to
state court), but inter-branch certification (executive-judicial), as I am
proposing here (judicial-legislative). The rationale for adopting federalstate court certification—reducing the need to speculate on the meaning
of law created by an external lawmaking body—is similar and applies to
the objective of the Court when interpreting a statute.
V. A MULTIPLE-CHOICE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
Congress would enable this procedure by enacting legislation
providing for “fast-track certification.” Fast-track legislation mandates
that certain measures are subject to expedited consideration in one or
both houses. Fast-track procedures eliminate committee reporting, floor
debates or amendments, and limit the time in which the measure must be
voted upon.42 Similar to existing fast-track legislation, this legislation
would: (1) prohibit sending the certified question to committee, (2) set a
time limit within which the question must reach the House and Senate
floor for consideration (i.e., the fast-track legislation for considering
federal trade agreements states that a vote on final passage of a trade
implementing bill “shall be taken in each House on or before the close
of the 15th day” from when it was reported to the floor43), (3)
specifically limit the time allotted for floor debate and prohibit
amendments, and (4) ensure that a final floor vote within the time
state intestate law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 98 N.Y.2d 198, 204 (2002) (whether a state statute
regulating insurers prohibits a “preferred repairer” clause in vehicle casualty policy); and Landoil Res.
Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 31 (1990) (whether a defendant’s activities
qualify as “doing business” within the state for the sake of the state’s long-arm statute).
40. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (“[Certification] save[s] time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.”); Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch
Federalism: Certification of State-Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 183
(2010).
41. Winship, supra note 40, at 192–95; CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
228 (Del. 2008).
42. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “FAST-TRACK” OR EXPEDITED PROCEDURES: THEIR PURPOSES,
ELEMENTS, AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (Jan. 21, 2003). Congress has enacted these forms of fast-track
procedures for voting on recommendations for military base closures and for legislation to implement
major international trade agreements.
43. Id. at 4.
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permitted cannot be prevented through delay (such as filibuster) in either
house.44
Both sides of this procedure would be voluntary—the Court would
only certify questions when the conference agrees to it as described
below, and the legislature would have the option of declining to answer
the question. I imagine that the Court should voluntarily invoke this
procedure only after hearing oral argument, conferencing the case,
debating reasoning supporting different views, and determining that
there will very likely be at least one dissenting opinion. Preserving the
procedure for use only where Justices endorse different outcomes
ensures that Congress is constrained to elect between outcomes that
Justices, in their legal expertise and application of statutory
construction, deem the best outcome (therefore implicitly constitutional
and legally viable). Justices would prepare statements detailing their
own statutory interpretation analysis (basically a summary of what
would be the majority and dissenting opinions), including their own
views about controlling methodology (e.g., Justice Scalia’s commitment
to adhering to the text’s plain meaning), substantive canons (e.g.,
presumption against retroactivity, lenity) and consistency with precedent
or other areas of the law. They would also draft a narrowly framed
multiple-choice question presenting the discrete choice between the
alternative interpretations. Just like a draft opinion, these materials
would be circulated to all members of the Court for approval, and
Justices would suggest changes to the formulation of the statements,
question and the answers, and negotiate the final version to be sent to
Congress. The question formulated through the Justices’ negotiation
would be worded carefully to present the ambiguity as abstractly,
neutrally and with as few additional words beyond those in the statute as
possible, without referring to facts of the specific case, or suggesting
one outcome over the other. These documents would not identify which
Justices are supporting either of the outcomes.
Before moving on, I should say an additional word about the Court’s
administration of this process: Questions might arise about what would
happen in the event that Justices cannot agree about whether to certify
the question, or as to the wording of the question. I am relying on the
Court’s ability, as a deliberative decisionmaking body, to negotiate
compromise and adhere to neutral procedures despite disagreement.
This ability is demonstrated in that the Court maintains collegiality in
making contentious decisions as to whether to grant cert, whether to
issue orders granting additional time for oral argument or other
procedural matters, and deciding upon the terms and language of
44. These are the typical provisions of effective fast-track procedures. Id. at 3.
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opinions. In addition to negotiating the language of written opinions,
the Court has also long managed to reach agreement on wording for
questions certified to state courts. I expect the conference would
likewise be able to formulate a consistent, neutral process for
determining whether to certify a question that is deemed fair and
workable, and that the Justices respect despite disagreement about the
outcome of a decision. The conference could adopt a standard similar to
deciding whether to grant cert: Justices could vote on whether to certify
a question, the Court would do so if four Justices favor it. Or the Court
might set the bar lower, allowing certification whenever at least one
Justice calls for certifying the question. And there is no reason to expect
the Court would be any more paralyzed by disagreement in formulating
the question presented to Congress than it is when circulating and
negotiating an opinion draft. Justices regularly have deep disagreements
about language and rationale for the ruling, and often go through many
circulations before an opinion satisfies all members endorsing the
outcome. The Court is accustomed to compromising over significant
differences in order to keep the institution functioning. Finally, because
the certifying a question is essentially a tool of statutory construction, a
member of the Court who does not agree with the methodology could
dissent on these grounds, arguing that certification was not an
appropriate method for deciding this case (one can imagine that a justice
might categorically disagree with certification, as Justice Scalia does
with legislative history). A dissenting Justice might also argue that the
certified question was wrongly phrased.
The congressional proceedings on a certified question would look like
this: The memo summarizing the legal reasoning of the potential
majority and dissent, along with the question, would be introduced on
the floor, and distributed to members of Congress. Importantly,
members of Congress would receive no indication of which Justices are
associated with the different outcomes presented. A floor vote would be
scheduled within fifteen days of the question’s introduction. On the day
of the scheduled vote, there would first be a vote on whether to answer
the question. If a majority favors not answering the question, then there
is no second vote, and the legislature is essentially punting the decision
back to the Court. Even this response would be informative to the
Court.
It would provide some license to Justices, generally
conscientious about lending sufficient deference to the will of elected
officials, to speak more plainly in terms of their own judgment about
how the statute should apply as a matter of the overarching policy,
practical concerns, or synthesis with existing law.
If a simple majority votes in favor of answering the question, the
second vote would ask which of the two alternatives it should be. The
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result of the vote in each house would be reported back to the Court.
Because Congress’s preferences are only evidentiary in the Court’s
decision, there is no need for a majority strong enough to pass
legislation to support one interpretation. It is important that the
congressional vote is reported in terms of aggregate numbers (e.g.,
64/99 voting Senators support interpretation “a”, and 35/99 support “b”;
320/400 voting Representatives support interpretation “a”; and 80/400
support “b”) since the purpose of the procedure is to provide the Court
evidence that allows it to gauge the strength (or uncertainty) of
congressional preferences. A strong majority of Congress preferring
one ruling would indicate that Congress could be inclined to overrule an
interpretation to the contrary. On the other hand, if a weak majority
preferred one ruling, or there is almost equal division, this suggests that
the law is genuinely ambiguous, and Congress is itself ambivalent or
indeterminate about what the law should say. Somewhat like a
congressional decision not to respond to the question, an ambivalent
response from Congress may signal to the Court that judicial expertise is
warranted in determining which interpretation to adopt. The next
section will illustrate how the procedure would apply in several of the
Court’s recent statutory interpretation decisions.
VI. APPLYING THE PROCEDURE IN RECENT STATUTORY DECISIONS
Here is how the procedure could have been used to address three
slightly different interpretive questions presented in recent statutory
cases—straightforward ambiguous language, whether a statute delegates
interpretive authority to an administrative agency, and whether a statute
makes a clear enough statement to overcome the presumption imposed
by a substantive canon of construction.
Ambiguous language: In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp,45 the Court was asked to decide between two possible
meanings of the words “file[] any complaint.” Katsen’s suit alleged that
his employer violated a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
making it unlawful “to discharge . . . any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint . . . under or related to [the Act],” by
firing Katsen. Katsen alleged that he was discharged because he
complained orally to his employer that its method of calculating
employees’ clock-in and clock-out times violated the Act. The Court
addressed whether “filed any complaint” includes oral complaints made
to the employer.46
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,

45. 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011).
46. Id. at 1329 (emphasis in original).
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acknowledged that the word “file” had different meanings: some
dictionary definitions contemplate a complaint made in writing, while
others suggest that something may be filed orally; in records of various
proceedings, legislators, judges, and administrators have all used the
word “file” in conjunction with oral statements; and other provisions of
the Act do not make clear whether a filing is inherently a written
complaint.47 Hence, “the text, taken alone, cannot provide a conclusive
answer to our interpretive question.”48 Justice Breyer reasoned that
“file” must be understood as including oral complaints, on account of
“the Act’s basic objective, . . . to prohibit ‘labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,’” and that it
“relies for enforcement of its substantive standards on information and
complaints received from employees.”49 Justice Breyer asked:
Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement scheme’s
effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s complaint procedure by those
who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing,
particularly the illiterate, less educated, or overworked workers who were
most in need of the Act’s help at the time of passage?50

Dissenting, Justice Scalia concluded that “filed any complaint” referred
to a much more limited realm of activities, not including any complaints
made directly to the employer. In the dissent’s view, “filed” implied
only formal charges made in an official court or administrative setting.
The dissent also speculated about what Congress wanted: “Congress
may not have . . . provide[d] a private cause of action for retaliation
against complaints[] because it was unwilling to expose employers to
the litigation, or to the inability to dismiss unsatisfactory workers, which
that additional step would entail.”51
If invoking a certification procedure, the Court would first write up a
statement of the legal reasoning in the opinions of Justice Breyer and
Justice Scalia, then draft a certified question along the lines of the
question presented. The question and answers might look like this:
Question: § 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act makes it unlawful
“to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint . . . under or related to
[the Act].” Does the term “filed any complaint” in § 215(a)(3):
Responses: (a) include oral complaints made directly to the employer; or
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1331–33.
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1333 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)).
Id.
Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/1

16

Evans: What Would Congress Want? If We Want to Know, Why Not Ask?

2013]

WHAT WOULD CONGRESS WANT?

1207

(b) include only formal charges made in an official court or
administrative proceeding and “not cover complaints to the employer at
all.”52

Agency Interpretations: Another slightly different question arises
when an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute is at issue, and
under Chevron v. N.R.D.C., the Court must address both whether an
ambiguity in the statute amounts to a delegation of lawmaking authority
to the agency (Chevron step 1), and second, whether the interpretation
the agency selected is based on a permissible construction of the statute
(Chevron step 2).53 A certification procedure seems particularly apt to
Chevron deference cases because inquiry into what Congress wanted is
twofold: first, whether Congress wanted to delegate lawmaking power to
another body, and second, whether Congress would approve of the
agency’s use of this authority.54 A certification procedure could be
informative at both layers of the Chevron inquiry. One recent Chevron
case might serve as an example of how certification would work in the
deference context: In Arlington v. F.C.C., the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) argued that the Communications Act, by authorizing
the agency to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary
in the public interest to carry out [its] provisions,” delegated it power to
define the specific statutory provision, “within a reasonable period of
time” for responding to a wireless siting application.55 The question
presented was whether the Court should defer to the agency’s
interpretation of the statute as giving it authority to define “within a
reasonable period of time” as 90 to 150 days, specifically. The agency
argued that Congress gave it this authority by providing it power to
prescribe necessary rules and regulations; and the courts should defer to
this determination. The majority reasoned that principles of Chevron
deference applied to the agency’s assessment that the statute gave it
power to make these specific rules. Because the statute’s language
allowed the agency to promulgate necessary rules and regulations, the
agency’s decision that it had lawmaking power to fill in “reasonable
period” was within the scope of its statutory authority.56
Justice Breyer’s concurrence argued that the Court should not defer to
the agency’s determination about whether the statute delegated it

52. Id. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
54. The idea that judges speculate as to congressional intent even more in Chevron cases is
supported by findings that the Court has been more likely to cite legislative history in Chevron
deference cases. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083 (2008).
55. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
56. Id. at 1874.
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authority to define a “reasonable period”; “[t]he question whether
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to provide an
interpretation that carries the force of law is for the judge to answer
independently . . . considering
‘traditional
tools
of
statutory
construction.’”57 Justice Breyer independently concluded that the
“reasonableness” provision does, in fact, leave a gap for the agency to
fill. He therefore agreed with the judgment that the FCC lawfully
promulgated regulations interpreting this provision.
The dissent argued that the majority and the lower court overlooked
Chevron step 1 by failing to evaluate whether the specific provision,
“within a reasonable period,” amounted to a delegation of interpretive
authority. The dissent emphasized structural principles pertaining to the
role of the judiciary vis-a-vis Congress and the Executive. It explained
that the judiciary is to determine what the law is, as defined by
Congress.
“We give binding deference to permissible agency
interpretations of statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated
to the agency the authority to interpret those ambiguities,” and “before a
court may grant such deference, it must on its own decide whether
Congress . . . has in fact delegated to the agency lawmaking power over
the ambiguity at issue.”58 Congress’s general grant of authority to
prescribe rules as necessary to carry out the statute “does not necessarily
mean that Congress granted the agency interpretive authority over all its
provisions.”59
While this decision implicates more fundamental questions about the
relative powers of courts and agencies, the core question was really
whether Congress’s general grant of power to prescribe rules and
regulations amounted to a delegation of authority to declare lawmaking
power with respect to this specific provision. The Court’s discussion
could have been enriched by the views of Congress. By indicating
whether it viewed the general grant of rulemaking authority as
delegation to the agency to flesh out the meaning of a specific provision,
Congress would be indicating its view on the extent that an agency may
assume a general grant of rulemaking power as authorizing it to
determine its own authority to fill in any specific provision in the
statute. In this case, the following two questions might be presented:
Question: The Communications Act grants the Federal Communications
Commission power to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest to carry out [its] provisions,” 47 U.S.C. §
201(b). Does this delegate the FCC authority to determine its own power

57. Id. at 1876 (Breyer, J. concurring)(internal quotations omitted).
58. Id. at *17 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
59. Id. at *21.
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to define “a reasonable period” in which local governments should
respond to a wireless siting application?
Responses: (a) the power to prescribe necessary rules and regulations
under § 201(b) grants the FCC power to determine that it has authority to
define the specific provision, “within a reasonable period”; or
(b) § 201(b) does not delegate power to the FCC to determine that it has
authority to define the specific provision, “within a reasonable period”;
any delegation of power must come from ambiguity within the provision
being defined, “within a reasonable period.” This provision is sufficiently
ambiguous to grant the FCC authority to issue an interpretation entitled to
judicial deference.
(c) § 201(b) does not delegate power to the FCC to define the specific
provision “within a reasonable period”; any delegation of power must
come from ambiguity within the provision being defined, “within a
reasonable period.” This provision is NOT sufficiently ambiguous to
grant the FCC authority to issue an interpretation entitled to judicial
deference.

If a simple majority prefers answer (a) or (b), the second question would
be:
Question: The FCC has determined that “a reasonable period” for a state
or local government to respond to a wireless siting application is 90-150
days. The Secretary’s determination is:
Responses: (a) a permissible construction of the statute; or (b) arbitrary,
capricious, or inconsistent with the statute.

In a case where the question presents three options to Congress, all three
alternatives would be simultaneously voted on, and the aggregate
support for each option would be reported to the Court. This eliminates
any risk that the ordering of the vote would skew outcome towards one
option or another.60 The number of legislators favoring one of three
options would be just as useful to the Court as knowing the number
favoring one of two options. In either case, the Court would have the
60. In three outcome cases, there might be concern for Condorcet’s Paradox; a vote between
three choices equally preferred amongst three groups of voters allows one group to set the agenda, by
giving up their first preference choice and voting for their second choice. See JERRY L. MASHAW,
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12–13 (1997). A
voting system that avoided Condorcet’s Paradox would adopt a Condorcet Method, where each voter
lists his preference rankings amongst three alternatives in order, and the winner is not determined by
who receives the majority of first choice votes, but who has the overall highest preference ranking.
Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, The Fairest Vote of All, SCIENTIFIC AM. MAG., Feb. 9, 2004. Potential
for this type of compromising should not detract from legitimacy of a congressional response any more
than it detracts from the legitimacy of legislation enacted through ordinary horse trading. After all,
legislation is well recognized to reflect strategic compromise and horse-trading amongst various
constituencies in Congress, and not expected to represent perfect majority rule, as in a sum tally of the
individual preference rankings of each member.
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sort of evidence that this procedure is best suited to provide: whether an
overwhelming majority of Congress prefers one outcome, such that the
Court is likely to be overruled if it adopts a different interpretation.
Substantive Cannons: The Court relies on substantive cannons to
promote constitutional or rule-of-law values external to the statute being
interpreted. Substantive cannons set a default construing legislation in
line with overarching legal values by putting a heavier burden on
Congress to clearly express its intent to enact legislation contrary to
those values. By requiring Congress to “speak clearly” in order to pass
a statute that encroaches on constitutional values, these canons “trigger
democratic (in the sense of legislative) processes and to ensure the
forms of deliberation, and bargaining, that are likely to occur in the
proper arenas.”61 For instance, the federalism cannon, requiring
Congress to “clearly express” its intent to create an exemption from
state taxation,62 and the presumption against preemption, requiring
Congress to make “clear and manifest” its purpose to supersede states’
historic police powers63 impose a higher burden on Congress to
override state sovereignty values—making sure Congress really
recognizes and means this result. Similarly, the common-law canon sets
a default in favor of consistency and predictability in the law by
requiring Congress to clearly indicate its intention for a statute to mean
something contrary to the common law that previously governed the
question.64
And the presumption against retroactivity, requiring
Congress to “clearly state” its intent for a provision of the statute to
apply retroactively, protects values of fair notice incorporated in the due
process and Ex Post Facto clauses of the Constitution.65 The canons
have been described as a “clarity tax” that raises the cost of passing
constitutionally sensitive legislation,66 and criticized as a “judge-made
constitutional penumbra.”67 This procedure would be apt in cases where
the Justices disagree about whether Congress has made a clear statement
sufficient to overcome such a presumption. This would enable the Court
to notify Congress that the legislation encroaches on a constitutional
value guarded by a substantive canon, and ask Congress whether it
really means to encroach on these values, without taking the moreextreme measure of automatically presuming the contrary.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(2010).
67.

Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 335 (2000).
Fl. Dept. of Rev. v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 544 U.S. 33, 50 (2008).
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 564 (2009).
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359 (2005).
Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 403
Posner, supra note 13, at 816.
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For instance, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,68 the Court was
faced with the question whether the Alien Tort Statute, providing that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States,” applies to torts occurring in a sovereign
territory outside the United States. (The defendant oil companies—
incorporated in the Netherlands and England—were alleged to have
aided the Nigerian government in violently suppressing Nigerian
demonstrators objecting to the environmental effects of the companies’
activities in Nigeria.) In concluding the law did not apply to torts
committed in foreign territories, the majority relied on the presumption
against extraterritoriality—”‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication
of an extraterritorial application, it has none.’”69 This “presumption that
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the
world . . . serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”70
The majority reasoned that there were three familiar offenses to which
ATS applied when it was first enacted—violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy—and ATS’s
intended application to these torts does not evince the “clear indication
of extraterritoriality” required to overcome the presumption.71 Justice
Kennedy concurred with the majority’s result and reasoning, noting that
future cases may require more elaboration on the proper implementation
of the presumption against extraterritorial application.72 And Justice
Alito’s concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the
presumption against extraterritoriality had not been overcome; and went
further to state that there is no cause of action under ATS unless the
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm “as
definite in content and acceptance” as the three principal offenses that
were familiar when ATS was enacted.73
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor,
concurred in the judgment based on the specifics of this case, but argued
for a very different understanding of whether ATS applies to conduct
outside the United States. They found that ATS did clearly indicate
extraterritorial application because it “was enacted with ‘foreign
matters’ in mind”: “the statute’s text refers explicitly to ‘alien[s],’
‘treat[ies],’ and ‘the law of nations.’”; its “purpose was to address
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Id. at 1664 (quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1665 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
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‘violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at
the same time threatening serious consequences in international
affairs.’”; and it is undisputed that Congress intended ATS to apply to
acts of piracy taking place on the high seas, which the Court has
traditionally treated as foreign territory.74 Because, in the concurrence’s
view, ATS is clearly intended to apply extraterritorially, ATS could
apply to actions occurring in sovereign territory outside the United
States if the defendant an American national or if “the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other
common enemy of mankind.”75 In this case, there was not a sufficient
connection between the United States and the parties or the conduct for
a national interest to be affected.
In this case, the Court would provide Congress with a statement of
the majority’s reasoning and the reasoning in Justice Breyer’s
concurrence that argues for an extraterritorial interpretation of ATS. (It
would likely be unnecessary to provide a statement of the reasoning in
the other two concurrences, since both adopt the majority’s view that
ATS fails to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
application. This would be for the Court to decide, depending on
whether Justice Kennedy or Justice Alito’s concurrence was seen as
endorsing a sufficiently different reading of the statute that it should be
included in the alternatives put before Congress.) In this case, the Court
might certify the following question:
Question: The Alien Tort Statute provides “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” The Court presumes that “when a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” When the Alien
Tort Statute was enacted, it was understood to apply to the offense of
piracy, which occurs on the high seas. Does the statute provide a clear
indication of extraterritorial application such that it can be applied to
conduct occurring outside the United States in the territory of a sovereign
nation?
Responses: (a) The Alien Tort Statute does not provide clear indication
of extraterritorial application; or
(b) The Alien Tort Statute does clearly indicate extraterritorial
application, and can therefore be applied to offenses that occur outside
the United States in the territory of a sovereign nation when defendant is

74. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J. concurring) (quotations omitted).
75. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J. concurring).
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an American national, or “the defendant’s conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming
a safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”

Congress’s response would allay the concern underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality: to “ensure that the Judiciary does
not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign
policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”76
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A MULTIPLE-CHOICE LEGISLATIVE
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
While this procedure calls on both branches to function differently
from their conventional roles, I would maintain that the procedure
comports with constitutional limitations on the legislature and judiciary,
especially because it is voluntary for both branches. I will address
potential constitutional objections to this certification procedure, which I
would expect to arise under Separation of Powers, the Ex Post Facto
clause, and the Presentment clause, as well as concern for balance of
power between the enacting and subsequent Congresses.
A. Separation of Powers
The Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence has been described as
a “doctrine easily invoked, but not clearly explained.”77 There are two
approaches taken to addressing separation of powers questions:
formalist and functionalist.78 Formalists view the powers of each branch
as limited to powers specifically prescribed in the vesting clauses of the
Constitution: “Article I grants Congress ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted;’ Article II grants the president ‘executive Power;’ and Article
III grants the judiciary ‘judicial Power.’”79 Under a formalist view,
separation of powers analysis turns on whether a branch of government
performs a function that falls outside the literal definition of its vested
power; i.e. whether the legislature’s activity is, in fact, ‘legislating.’80
The functionalist approach recognizes that each branch of government is
given ‘core’ functions by the vesting clauses, but these do not represent

76. Id. at 1664.
77. Jellum, supra note 10, at 855.
78. Id. at 854–55.
79. Id. at 861.
80. The Court has explained that legislative acts “[have] the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch.” INS v. Chahda, 462
U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
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absolute limitations. The goal of the analysis is to ensure no branch
becomes too powerful, rather than formally restrict each branch to the
literal definition of its vested function. The Court has recognized that
the functionalist approach may more accurately meet the demands of an
ever-changing government, explaining “[t]he Constitution by no means
contemplates total separation of each of these three essential branches,”
as “a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively.”81 This is particularly true in light of the
increasingly complex executive institutions in the modern administrative
state.82 The functional approach asks two questions to determine
whether separation of powers has been violated: Whether one branch
has “interfere[d] impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function,” or whether “one branch assume[d] a
function that more properly is entrusted to another.”83
It might be argued that this procedure violates separation of powers
because the legislature would be assuming a judicial function when
voting on a question about a statute’s meaning. After all, the Court has
explained that the power of “‘[t]he interpretation of the laws’ is ‘the
proper and peculiar province of the courts.’”84 But with this procedure
Congress is only acting as a part of the judicial decisionmaking process,
at the request of the Court, to provide evidence that the Court has
deemed relevant and asked to hear. The Court has upheld at least one
Act of Congress doing much more to dictate the outcome of a pending
decision.
In Robertson v. Seattle Audobon, a provision attached to
appropriations legislation referred to two pending cases by name and
caption number, and was plainly designed to dictate the outcome of
those cases.85 The Seattle Audobon plaintiffs alleged that the Forest
Service and Bureau of Land Management violated the administrative
guidelines governing the oversight of protected habitats under the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and
the National Forest Management Act when they proposed timber
harvesting in protected habitats of the spotted owl. Congress’s next
appropriations act contained an amendment specifying that less rigorous
guidelines, with which the agencies were already compliant, applied to
the protected habitats in question. The legislation specifically stated that
81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
82. Jellum, supra note 10, at 870 (“[For] a government confronted with the complexity of the
twenty-first century, functionalism seems to be winning the war.”).
83. Chahda, 462 U.S. at 919, 963 (Powell, J. concurring); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
84. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995).
85. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1992).
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“the Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas
according to . . . this section . . . is adequate consideration for the
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the
consolidated cases . . . ,” and listed names and caption numbers of the
two pending cases.86 The Ninth Circuit found that the congressional
enactment “directs the court to reach a specific result and make certain
factual findings under existing law in connection with two [pending]
cases” and “held the provision unconstitutional under United States v.
Klein, . . . which it construed as prohibiting Congress from
‘direct[ing] . . . a particular decision in a case, without repealing or
amending the law underlying the litigation.’”87
The Court unanimously reversed, finding Congress’ case-specific
enactment constitutional since it “compelled changes in law, not
findings or results under old law.”88 The Court reasoned that “what
Congress directed—to agencies and courts alike—was a change in law,
not specific results under old law.”89
If what Congress did in Seattle Audobon was constitutional—
declaring the law requires ‘x’ as applied to two pending cases; it is
likely that Congress providing evidence of its preference between the
options predefined by the Court, would also be constitutional. Because
the vote is in no way binding, and the options presented are based on
readings that the Justices would otherwise reach, Congress does far less
to compel a specific result or change the law than it did in Seattle
Audobon.90
Nor does this certification procedure suffer the problems associated
with the legislative veto that the Court found unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha.91 One house retained the automatic and absolute power to
review and veto each executive decision granting a pardon from
deportation. While the majority found that the legislative veto violated
the bicameralism and presentment clauses, Justice Powell’s concurrence
argued that it should be invalidated on separation of powers grounds.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 436. In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall 128 (1871), the Court held unconstitutional
legislation invalidating the preexisting judicial rule that a presidential pardon would be taken as
presumptive evidence that the pardoned individual had not aided or abetted the enemy during war. This
statute violated separation of powers because it “prescribe[d] rules of decision to the Judicial
Department of the government in cases pending before it.” Id. at 133–34.
88. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438.
89. Id. at 439. The Court has explained that “[w]hatever the precise scope of Klein . . . later
decisions have made clear that its prohibition [on enactments prescribing specific outcomes] does not
take hold when Congress ‘amend[s] applicable law.’” Miller, 530 U.S. at327 349.
90. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), the Court held that the legislature
could not “retroactively command[] the federal courts to reopen final judgments” without violating
separation of powers.
91. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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According to Justice Powell, the House’s actions were “clearly
adjudicatory” because “[t]he House did not enact a general rule; rather it
made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply
with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type of decision that
traditionally has been left to other branches.”92 With this procedure, as
in Seattle Audobon, Congress speaks to a general rule. Congress is not
asked to vote on how the law applies to a given set of facts; but rather, it
makes a statement about what it would prefer the law to mean in the
abstract. Most critically, this procedure is not intrusive on the
judiciary’s function because it is voluntary and non-binding. In a sense,
when the Court chooses to certify a question, it is doing little more than
it does when it looks at floor statements, a committee report or another
form of legislative history; it is simply seeking testimony of
congressional preferences to fit into its own interpretive analysis;
evidence it may weight or disregard as it sees fit.
Further indication that this procedure comports with separation of
powers may be found in the presumed constitutionality of legislative
directives on statutory interpretation. Commentators have concluded
that legislative rules prescribing methods of statutory construction, as
enacted by a number of state legislatures,93 would be unlikely to violate
separation of powers, and have urged Congress to enact rules governing
interpretation of federal statutes.94 Even statutory default rules encroach
more on judicial decisions than the certification procedure proposed
here. First, these rules are binding on the courts, and, second, they
dictate a particular outcome insofar as they require the outcome
compelled by one interpretive methodology to trump the outcome
compelled by another interpretive method which the Justices may prefer.
B. Presentment clause
Another conceivable objection is that accepting a congressional vote
on a statutory interpretation question without the President’s approval
would violate the Presentment Clause.95 First, “[n]ot every action taken
by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment
requirements.” Only acts of legislative power are subject to these
requirements, and this depends “upon whether they contain matter
which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and
92. Id. at 964–65 (Powell, J. concurring).
93. See Gluck, supra note 2.
94. See Jellum, supra note 10; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1698–99 (2002).
95. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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effect.”96 Because this procedure is not law-making; it amounts to
something closer to a judicially prompted “sense-of-Congress”
resolution, it does not seem to trigger the requirements of the
presentment clause.
While I do not think that Congress’s response need be subject to
presentment requirements, there is no reason that the question and the
legislature’s response could not be presented to the President. The
President could have the option of “vetoing” the legislature’s response
by indicating that she prefers a different interpretation; in which case the
court could consider the President’s contrary view in determining how
to weight Congress’s preference, this could potentially be a basis for
lessening the weight given to congressional preferences.
The
President’s response would be, like Congress’s, wholly optional. The
President would be likely to weigh in only in the event of significant
disagreement with the legislature’s vote. This is because a presidential
vote contrary to Congress’s would counteract legislative preferences,
and it would therefore have the same meaning in terms of powerdynamics as vetoing a piece of legislation.
C. Ex Post Facto
Justice Powell’s Chadha concurrence also emphasized Ex Post Facto
concerns that arise from allowing Congress to make case-by-case
determinations, stressing “the danger of subjecting the determination of
the rights of one person to the tyranny of shifting majorities.”97 A
politicized body might be inclined to make rash decisions motivated by
the political climate surrounding a specific case, regardless of the
preexisting law that the subject of the decision has relied upon. “Unlike
the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by
established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural
safeguards . . . that are present when a court or an agency adjudicates
individual rights.”98 Frost acknowledges that her proposal, prompting
the legislature to amend the law as it applies to a pending decision, may
raise Ex Post Facto concerns. This risk is eliminated here, where the
Justices would first rely on their tools of construction, including
substantive canons such as the presumption against retroactivity
(presuming prospective application so as to guard against Ex Post Facto
violations),99 before putting a potential interpretation as an option before
Congress. The Justices would not give Congress the option of an
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 952.
462 U.S. at 961 (Powell, J. concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 966.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994).
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interpretation that they are not prepared to adopt, and thus impliedly find
constitutional. The fact that this procedure is bookended by judicial
review also mitigates the problem of politicized decisionmaking: The
Court could alter the way that it weighs Congress’s vote if it observes
that the specifics of this particular case were highly politicized, and that
Congress was focused on the outcome rather than the abstract meaning
of the statute. It may be apparent, in retrospect, that legislators made
public statements about their views on the facts underlying the case
(e.g., “this particular defendant should be imprisoned for the heinous
crime he committed”), rather than the abstract interpretive question, or
that media coverage framed the vote almost exclusively as being about
whether this defendant should go to prison, rather than the abstract
statutory question—”does term ‘y’ in the statute mean ‘a’ or ‘b’?”. If
this were the case, the Court might explain that because Congress’s vote
appeared to be oriented around the result of this particular case, it is not
convinced Congress considered the meaning of the legislation in
abstract (in terms of how it would apply in other cases, how it fits with
other statutory provisions or the policy animating that statute, its
compatibility with other areas of the law, consistency with previous
judicial decisions, or constitutional values).
The possibility of this occurrence should not rule out the viability of
certification. The potential for this sort of politicization will vary widely
depending on the nature of the case. A question of less public salience,
such as the delegation of authority to the FCC, or the meaning of the
term “file” within the Fair Labor Standards Act, would be less
conducive to the same sort of case-specific politicization. Vulnerability
to this sort of case-specific politicization is a consideration for the Court
in determining whether to certify the question. Also, political debate
about the abstract statutory question, rather than the outcome of this
specific case, would not undermine the legitimacy of this procedure. If
for instance, the public debates whether “file” within the Fair Labor
Standards Act should include an oral complaint made directly to the
employer, it would be legitimate for this discourse to bear on Congress’s
vote, since the whole purpose is to defer to contemporary democratic
will.
D. Intra-branch Tension—Subsequent vs. Enacting Legislature
One of the most significant concerns may be that this certification
procedure takes into account the will of the contemporary legislature,
rather than the enacting one. It could be argued that a later Congress
should have no constitutional role in elaborating on or interpreting an
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earlier Congress’s enactments.100 It is not clear that the Constitution
requires any particular balance of power between enacting and
subsequent legislatures. The Court has described the Constitution as
being concerned with “the distribution of powers among the three
coequal Branches; it does not speak to the manner in which authority is
parceled out within a single Branch.”101 Article I says nothing about
balance of power between previous and subsequent Congresses, and
charges Congress with designing its own procedural rules.
If not characterized as a constitutional or balance of power issue, one
could argue that a later Congress has no status as an authority on
legislation enacted by earlier Congress. But this claim belies the Court’s
consistent practice of looking to post-enactment legislative signals in
statutory interpretation decisions. With these decisions, the Court veryplainly recognizes the relevance of the preferences of post-enactment
Congresses. Considering the preferences of more contemporary
Congresses makes sense, insofar as Justices aim to avoid an
interpretation that today’s Congress will overrule.102 Looking to the
preferences of present-day legislators also comports with democratic
values: contemporary legislative will, as opposed to the will of enacting
legislators, best represents current political preferences; and deferring to
present political preferences generates greater political satisfaction than
deferring to past political preferences.103 For this reason, one writer has
observed that given the choice, most legislators (and their constituents)
would prefer to influence the meaning of all present legislation, rather
than permanently influence the future interpretations of legislation
enacted while they were in office.104
Third, it makes practical sense to consider contemporary preferences
because interpretation of a statute often becomes more problematic with
time as social and legal context changes.105 Contemporary legislators
provide more valuable guidance on what a statute should mean in light
of present circumstances. Positive political theory provides a dynamic
account of statutory law akin to common law. Instead of having one

100. James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1994); see also; Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v.
GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117–18 (1980); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
101. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167–68 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
102. Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 51, 54 (1994).
103. Elhauge, supra note 13.
104. Id. at 2029 (“Even for the enacting government, a general default [interpretive] rule that
accurately tracks current preferences (rather than the preferences of the government that enacted each
statute) will maximize its political satisfaction.”).
105. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS
75, 78 n.14 (1994).
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meaning, fixed at the point of enactment, legislation develops and
changes through ongoing collaboration between legislators overseeing
agencies that administer the statute and interpret it to address new
problems, and courts who apply it to particular situations.106 An
advantage of common law is that courts have flexibility to update the
law as circumstances change and problems in its application become
apparent through litigation. The same updating and adapting is
desirable in a regime governed by statutory law in order to make the law
best fit present reality. This procedure is geared toward facilitating
collaboration between Congress and the Court in this sort of dynamic
elaboration of statutory law.
The greater relevance of recent legislative preferences is reflected in
canons addressing the balance of power between Congresses over time:
the last in time rule provides that, when two pieces of legislation cannot
be interpreted so as to avoid conflict, the most recently enacted one
governs. The rule against entrenchment prohibits previous Congresses
from enacting laws constraining the authority of future Congresses.
Both of these rules reflect the value that more contemporary
congressional preferences trump older ones.
The Court has often found the views or actions of more recent
Congresses relevant to interpreting a provision enacted by an earlier
Congress. In Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil,107 the Court held
that the Merchant Marine Act authorized the Secretary to release a ship
owner from conditions imposed in exchange for a subsidy provided
under the Act, once the ship owner repaid the subsidy. The provision in
question was enacted in 1934, and the 1971 and 1972 Congresses had
proposed an amendment to the Act granting the Secretary authority to
do exactly this. However, the House Committee report explained that it
removed the language because the instances where the Secretary might
invoke its authority to release a ship from conditions imposed as a part
of a subsidy arose too infrequently, and the Committee “questions the
desirability of general legislation to deal with such an unusual
situation.”108
The Court relied on this “understanding” of the
subsequent Congress, explaining that “while the views of subsequent
Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one,
such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when
the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.”109 The same
year as Seatrain, another decision explained that while, “arguments
predicated upon subsequent congressional actions must be weighed with
106.
107.
108.
109.

Eskridge, supra note 105.
444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980).
Id.
Id.
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extreme care, they should not be rejected out of hand as a source that a
court may consider in the search for legislative intent.”110
In F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson,111 the Court concluded that
tobacco products were not “restricted devices” under the 1965 Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.112 Rather than relying exclusively on analysis
of what the 1965 Congress meant by the term “restricted device,” the
Court also focused on laws enacted by subsequent Congresses, which
acknowledged the importance of tobacco to national industry.
“Congress’ . . . decisions to regulate labeling and advertising and to
adopt the express policy of protecting commerce and the national
economy . . . to the maximum extent reveal its intent that tobacco
products remain on the market.”113 The Court’s opinion plainly speaks
in the present tense of ongoing congressional intent. The Court
explained:
At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible
meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those
meanings . . . a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should
control our construction of the earlier statute, even though it has not been
expressly amended.114

Furthermore, in 2008, the Court relied on the history surrounding a
1995 amendment to interpret the scope of liability under a much older
section of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Leading up to
the 1995 amendment, the Senate subcommittee considered a
recommendation to establish a private cause of action for aiding and
abetting violations of the securities laws. However, the enacted
amendment authorized only the Securities and Exchange Commission.,
not private plaintiffs, to prosecute aiders and abettors. The Court relied
on the deliberations that took place during the 1995 amendments in
order to interpret a preexisting provision of the Act as not allowing
actions by private parties against aiders and abettors of securities
violations. The Court quoted Seatrain’s statement that views of
subsequent Congresses are “entitled to significant weight,” and Brown
& Williamson’s explanation that the implications of a later statute may
alter the meaning of an earlier one.115 The Court has also explained that

110. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (relying on the legislative history—comments in the Conference Committee
analysis—of the 1972 amendments to the Equal Opportunity Act to inform interpretation of a provision
enacted in 1964).
111. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
112. Id. at 134.
113. Id. at 139 (internal quotations omitted).
114. Id. at 143.
115. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008).
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more recent legislators’ understanding of the statute shapes “public
reliance” on whatever the later Congress’s understanding of the law
was, even if different from the original Congress’s view. Justice Scalia,
who opposes reference to legislative history, has acknowledged the
relevance of this form of reliance.116
Another more subtle way that the Court recognizes the relevance of
contemporary legislators’ preferences is by considering Congress’s
acquiescence to an agency interpretation as reason to adopt that reading.
In Bob Jones v. United States,117 the Court upheld the Internal Revenue
Service’s (IRS) determination that private schools which discriminate
based on race are ineligible for tax-exempt non-profit status under
federal tax laws. In reaching this result, the Court noted that postenactment Congresses had considered and ultimately rejected
amendments to override the agency’s interpretation: “Failure of
Congress to modify the IRS rulings . . . and Congress’
awareness . . . when enacting other and related legislation make out an
unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence . . . and ratification by
implication.”118 The fact that post-enactment Congresses had accepted
the agency’s interpretation says nothing about what the enacting
Congress intended. In finding recent Congress’s acquiescence to an
agency’s ruling a reason to adopt an interpretation of a statute, the Court
recognizes that the views of contemporary legislators are at least
relevant, if not controlling, as to what a statute should mean. This
shows how statutory meaning is dynamic—it is not fixed at what the
enacting legislature had in mind, but changes as agencies, overseen in
part by Congress, develop interpretations to fit new circumstances.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Insofar as the Court is, as the foregoing discussion suggests,
concerned with deferring to contemporary democratic preferences, this
certification procedure would enable it to do so more accurately,
legitimately, and reliably than adducing these preferences from the
forms of post-enactment legislative history relied upon in the decisions
discussed above. A critique of legislative history—both enacting and
post-enactment Congresses—is that it is non-representative. There is no
guarantee that views expressed in the committee reports or floor debates
116. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395 (1991); Justice Scalia also invoked postenactment legislative views in Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 78 (1992) (Scalia, J.
concurring) (recognizing that subsequent enactments “must be read” as an “implicit acknowledgement”
of the chosen interpretation).
117. Bob Jones v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
118. Id. at 599.
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reflect the majority preference.
“If ordinary legislative history
is . . . often cooked up by congressional staff and lobbyists to try to slant
interpretation after the fact, the possibility for abuse is worse with
subsequent legislative history.”119 The certification procedure avoids
this problem because it allows the Court to much more reliably ascertain
the preference of the majority. Those who oppose considering evidence
of legislative intent because of the unrepresentative and potentially
selective nature of legislative history may be more open to considering
the legislative views expressed through a fully representative vote.
In conclusion, I stress that I am not advocating supplanting
Congress’s judgment for that of the Court. This procedure is geared
toward facilitating collaboration between Congress and the Court,
drawing from the particular competencies of each branch: Congress is
democratically representative and has lawmaking prerogative; the
Justices make decisions from a “longer view” of history, keeping in
mind overarching constitutional values, and the ideals of stability,
predictability, and intelligibility in the law.120 While I have argued that
this procedure would aid the Court insofar as it speaks in terms of
deferring to legislative will, there are reasons that Congress’s vote
should only be taken as marginally persuasive, not dispositive, evidence
in support of one interpretation. First, busy legislators presented with a
certified question might be inclined to vote rashly in response based on
their immediate reaction to the question, without having the time to
research the statute or delve more deeply into its context, application,
and effects. Beyond the few who are particularly interested in the issue,
otherwise preoccupied legislators could be unlikely to dedicate the same
reasoned thought and analysis to the matter that a the Court might—
looking at the context of enactment, the problems that are playing out in
administration, how the interpretation comports with other portions of
the law, or the impact the interpretation would have on other cases. Or
legislators might be heavily swayed by instant political preferences
rather than long term overarching constitutional and public policy values
that judges take into account when interpreting legislation. One could
imagine lobbyists petitioning legislators to vote one way or another, or
constituents otherwise pressuring for particular results. Legislators
might also see the vote as an opportunity for horse-trading, agreeing to
vote in one direction in exchange for other constituents’ votes on some
other matter. These factors don’t seem illegitimate, per se, as a basis for
defining the law, as they describe the climate in which laws are initially
enacted. But they do show that judges make a valuable contribution to

119. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 1041.
120. Albert, supra note 12.
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the meaning of legislation when they interpret it. This procedure would
eliminate speculation about legislative intent, and knowing Congress’s
preference, the Court’s decision might transparently discuss the
interplay between congressional preferences and legitimate judiciallyenforced values—values that safeguard the constitution and promote
consistency, predictability, and uniformity in our law.
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